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prophecies where the expectation of the entry can trigger the coordination of expectations towards
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This paper covers all countries former communist countries in Europe that have association agreements with     1
the European Union and are thus eligible for EU membership under the terms of the Copenhagen Declaration.
They are often grouped under various, ugly acronyms such as CEECs (countries of central and eastern Europe).
The geographical division of Europe into central and eastern is imprecise at best. For ease of exposition,
therefore, we shall refer to the group of 10 countries where association agreements are signed or being
negotiated  (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia , Lithuania
and Estonia) as Central Europe. 
EU MEMBERSHIP FOR CENTRAL EUROPE: 
COMMITMENTS, SPEED AND CONDITIONALITY
Alain de Crombrugghe, Zanny Minton-Beddoes, and Jeffrey D. Sachs
INTRODUCTION
Eastward enlargement is the single biggest challenge facing the European Union today. The
broad goal of integrating the newly democratic countries of Central Europe into the1
European Union is widely shared. In its Copenhagen declaration of June 1993 the European
Union offered membership of the Union to those former communist European countries that
wished to join and that fulfilled certain, ill defined, political and economic criteria. With the
conclusion of Association Agreements and, in some cases, with the presentation of
membership applications, the Central Europeans have signaled their desire for membership
of the Union. The question is no longer one of if, but of when and how.
This paper is a contribution towards that end. Its basic theme is that rapid membership is both
desirable and possible. Achieving it will require greater clarity and greater commitment from
both sides than is currently present. It is o longer enough to regard eastward enlargement
as a vague, if desirable, goal.  The road map of how to get there urgently needs to be
designed.
In the first part of the paper we refer to r c n  developments in economic theory to show the
importance of a clearer commitment to enlargement. A transparent commitment would
accelerate a cumulative process of investment and growth in Central Europe; it would attract
more foreign investors into the region and would supp rt the reform process. The experience
of Spain and Portugal in the 1980s provides evidence of such a process.
The second section of the paper reviews current issues and the avenues already explored in
the preparation for accession. We acknowledge that there are sensitive issues involved (for
instance, in agriculture) but suggest that they need not, and should not, provide an excuse for
prevarication. We explain the inadequacies of the EU’s current approach and warn agai st
a “pre-accession strategy” that lacks enforcement and commitment procedures.
In the third part of the paper we explain the basic premises of our approach to enlargement.
We discuss the importance of a target date as a commitment mechanism. We show how the
conditionality that is opaquely implied in the Copenhagen Declar tio  could be translated into
practice. As part of our design of conditionality we include transitional modalities of entry in
2some sensitive areas (as was the case with other accessions). We focus on the importance of
conditionality to promote economic reform and to attract countries that would be able to
fulfill the obligations of membership and contribute to the devel pment of the Union.  Section
four presents a modest proposal for the steps policy makers should undertake now.
1.      The case for rapid enlargement
Economic theory and recent experiences within the European Union suggest that enlargement
should be rapid and subject to clear conditions. Such a scenario is not only explicitly
requested by the most advanced countries of Central Europe, it is also th  one that maximizes
the chances of success of the enlargement goal announced at the Copenhagen Summit. (Note
that we are only considering the economic aspects of enlargement here; the geopolitical and
security motivations for rapid enlargement under clear conditions are no doubt as large, or
even larger, than the purely economic considerations).
Economic reforms are pursued to promote economic growth. The growth-promoting actions
of private economic agents (in the form of investments, sectoral reallocation, political support
for reforms) will tend to be stronger if refo ms are credible, that is, if they are expected to be
permanent, and if each agent believes that other agents will also expect them to be permanent.
In many cases, economic choices depend largely on an agent’s belief of how other agents will
behave, and only to a limited extent upon the initial condit ons inherited from history. In these
circumstances, economic success or failure is, in large part, based on the public’s expectations
about he future. A “good” equilibrium will be characterized by optimism, high investment
and growth; a “bad” equilibrium by pessimism, low investment and stagnation. Examples of
this kind of multiple equilibrium include models of industrialization (Matsuyama 1991), of
geographical concentration of economic activity (Krugman 1991), of migration (Baldwin and
Venables 1994), and of fiscal balance or collapse (Sachs 1995).  
The message of recent theories of growth and cumulative processes is that underdevelopment
traps can exist, but can be avoided in three ways. The first two are traditional policy
responses: governments should attempt to change the initial, adverse, conditions or attempt
to improve the flexibility of the economy. The third method, however, is  to orient
expectaions in the direction of future growth. Underlying  this third approach is the
aforementioned principle that the investment decisions of an individual agent depend upon his
expectations of the investment decisions of other agents, so that multiple outcomes are
therefore possible from the same initil co d tions: low investment and low growth if agents’
expectations are pessimistic; high investments and  high growth outcome if they are
optimistic. Expectations, whether positive or negative, can therefore be self-fulfilling.   
A small model of self-fulfilling rational expectations in the spirit of Krugman (1991) attached
in appendix A formalizes this process in a manner relevant for the issue of EU enlargement.
Policies to increase the flexibility of an economy or improve the initial conditions (e.g.
through an exogenous boom in foreign direct investment) can boost growth, but we show that
a crucial factor in putting an economy on a virtuous growth path is a policy that co-ordinates
the positive expectations of investors.  
A commitment to rapid accession does not, however, preclude there being long transition periods for     2
sensitive sectors.
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A quick and guaranteed accession to the European Union represents, by far, the most
effective way to stabilize expectations in Central Europe and so ensure that this region
remains on the path of growth. Participation in the EU market offers indispensable long-term
development opportunities for Central Europe n businesses. More importantly, the discipline
of the EU’s legal framework and enforcement institutions offer guarantees of a reliable
economic environment. By offering a credible time-table for membership, the European Union
can co-ordinate the expectations of agents in Central Europe, and of potential foreign
investors, towards a high-investment, high-growth equilibrium. The time horizon over which
accession is expected to occur will affect the credibility of the commitment. A vague
commitment o membership that does not envisage accession for a decade or more will be
perceived as less credible than one which foresees rapid accession. Thus the goal of
coordinating positive expectations requires a clear delineation of the conditions and modalities
of entry together with a credible (and preferably) short time-table. 2
Various commentators within the Commission, in key EU national governments and in the
academic ommunity, assert that membership should “certainly” occur, but only after the
Central and Eastern European countries have substantially converged to Western European
income levels. One widely cited benchmark is that living standards among the new entrants
should be equal to at least 75 percent of the EU average. Such a standard would virtually
invite a self-fulfilling, pessimistic outcome. Suppose that rapid convergence is i  fact
achievable, but only if there are widespread expectations among investors that enlargement
will actually occur. In those circumstances, a low-level trap is possible, in which “informed
opinion” among investors fears that enlargement will be long delayed, with the result that
investment in fact remains low and enlargement is, in fact, long delayed. This kind of vicious
circle, or self-fulfilling prophecy, would obviously be overcome by a clear commitment to a
time-table on enlargement, even one conditional on the applicant undertaking the economic
reform measures necessary to underpin rapid economic growth. 
Of course, this argument is predicated on the view that Central Europea  economies will have
a tendency towards convergence (i.e. economic growth more rapid than the EU) assuming
that they can be nudged to the “optimistic” equilibrium. There is very strong reason to believe
that membership in the EU will, in fact, underpin very rapid economic growth on a sustained
basis. Economic theory (cf. Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995) and empirical evidence (Dowrick
and Nguyen, 1989; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1995) teach that
poorer economies have a strongtendency to converge in living standards with richer trading
partners, if the poorer economies have guaranteed market access to the richer partners, and
if the poorer countries pursue reasonable economic policies, especially in the areas of open
trade and macroeconomic stability. This suggests that the necessary combination for rapid
growth is assured and rapid accession, backed up by EU conditionality on the applicant
country regarding the conduct of key domestic policies in the run-up to membership. 
4The domestic and foreign investment boom experienced by Portugal and Spain after entry into
the European Community in 1986 is a good example of the type of growth spurt accession
can trigger. In those particular cases the timing of accession may also have played an
important role, since accession coincided with the launch of the Single Market programme
in 1985, which spurred important reforms throughout Europe. (The dismal growth and
investment performance of  Spain and Portugal in the first decade of their democratic reforms
also coincided with the oil crises). 
The urgency of bolstering investor confidence in Central and Easte n Europe is real. The rates
of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region remain very low -- surprisingly low --
especially in comparison with the FDI flowing into East Asian economies that are at
approximately the same level of development. Amazingly, Singapore (with 2 million
population) absorbs more FDI each year than the combined total of Central and Eastern
Europe (with 150 million population). Most CEOs of multinational firms still do not view
Central Europe as export platforms for their sales in the European Union. Corporate planning
of production for the EU market typically neglects th  opportunities for sourcing some of the
European-based production in Central Europe. 
The establishment of a link between rapid EU entry and faster growth has several
implications. First, it suggests that new EU members, even relatively poo  ones, need not long
be a burden on the EU budget. This will, of course, depend on the practical deals that are
struck within the EU institutions on the extension of EU transfers (the so-called structural
funds) to new members, which we discuss below. Nevertheless, the big picture is clear: poor
countries could soon be relatively rich. Portugal entered the EC in 1986 with a GDP per
capita equal to 32 percent of the EU average. By 1992 Portugal has  improved its position
relative to every other member, and stood at 53 percent of the average. Moreover, the desire
of Portugal and Ireland and, to a lesser extent of Spain and Italy, not to get left behind in the
further process of European integration has boosted their general modernization and growth
performance. These same incentives are already working in Poland and the Czech Republic.
A clearer commitment would greatly reinforce these incentives and extend them to other,
more laggardly, potential entrants.
Second, the possibility of a negative equilibrium, an underdevelopment trap of low investment
and low growth is al o a warning that failing to give a clear chance to Central Europe could
have serious implications. At best it would be a missed opportunity for growth in Western as
well as Central Europe. Martin (1994) has shown how Central Europe could try to compete
with the European Union in protectionism. At worst, a failure in Central Europe could
seriously endanger peace and security in Western Europe not only through illegal migration
or new military threats, but through political unrest, illegal trades in arms and drugs and other
acts of desperation.
2. Current “pre-accession” issues and alternative proposals
A generous interpretation of the current “pre-accession” strategy proposed by the European
Union is that it is pragmatic. A more realistic d scription would be to call it ill-defined. While
5numerous initiatives to draw in the Central Europeans have been undertaken in
uncontroversial areas, there is a noticeable lack of commitment and specificity regarding
membership The absence of a target date or of pre-announced modalities of entry is largely
due to unresolved difficulties inside the Union. The Union has begun to define and examine
the implications of eastward enlargement, but has gone little further than that. The three main
developments so far are the structured dialogue (“dialogue structural” (COM (94) 361); the
White Paper on the single market (COM (95)163); and studies of sensitive issues like
agriculture. All these steps are useful but they are characterized by an absence of binding
power. Under the guise of  an organized postponement they have the potential to delay actual
accession.
The structured dialogue was instigated after the Corfu Summit of June 1994. It recognized
the need for a closer process of political consultation between the European Union and the
Central European countries, both to monitor the Europe Agreements and to make progress
on issues of mutual political concern (security, drug trafficking etc). It acts as a useful
learning process for Central European countries to understand the operations of the EU. It
can provide a helpful forum in which to discuss economic progress. The invitations extended
to Central European countries to attend part of the EU summits since the December 1994
(Essen) summit, has also given enhanced visibility to the integration process. A more
organized format for political dialogue, which is essentially what the structured dialogue boils
down to, is important, but it cannot substitute for participation in common institutions and
for abiding by common rules. It does not go over the line that separates OECD-type co-
operation from EU-style policy integration. 
The White Paper on the Single Market (COM (95) 163 & annex) provides guidelines for
potential Central European applicants on the regulation of the single market. In essence it is
a legal shopping list, a description of he legal and regulatory apparatus that is required for
participation i  the EU’s single market. But, crucially, it has no binding force and provides
no guarantee of future benefits. The associatd countries can adopt the contents of the White
Paper without being sure that they will be closer to being considered for accession. The EU
does not offer single market treatment, or indeed any improved trade access, for countries or
sectors that implement th  rules. Contingent protection, especially recourse to anti-dumping
measures, is not abandoned. 
In addition to these legal limitat ons, the White Paper lacks any sense of economic priorities.
Its contents are rooted in legal rather than economic logic. Within the rules of the single
market, two steps are distinguished, according to a legal logic that goes from general to
particular rules. The chapters are not prioritized and the possible accumulation of distortions
from old and new rules is not discussed. Moreover, there is no indication of measurable
economic indicators that could complement the regulations as indices of integration. The
White Paper provides no informati n on how progress towards a “market  economy” should
be measured.  The fact that the White Paper on the Single Market remains the sole concrete
part of a “roadmap” towards accession and that it is so uncompromisingly legalistic is
instructive. Preparing for accession, as far as the EU is concerned, appears to mean the pro
forma adoption of  the rules of the “acquis communautaire” and, so far, nothing more. 
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fulfill the regulatory and legal requirements of the “acquis communautaire” is beyond doubt.
In three areas, in particular, it will have profound implications: first, on the internal
organization and structure of EU institutions. A Union of 25 cannot function with a decision-
making and organizational structure designed originally for 6 members. Second, on the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): the integration of the more agricultural economies of
Central Europe will, eventually, have a huge impact on the financial viability of the CAP’s
system of market intervention and price support. Third, on the financial transfers within the
Union. With the accession of several, poorer economies, the criteria of the EU’s structural
funds will need redesign.
A number of scholars have begun to analyze the political economy of these shifts (Baldwin
1994, Widgren 1994). The Union has not ignored them either. The Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC) of 1996 will address the issue of the design of institutions, both to fulfil the
extended objectives of the Union as set out in the Treaty of Maastricht (deepening) and to
ensure that they can function with more members (widening). Discussions of the future
division of power between common institutions and national governments, of “variable
geometry” or a European “hard core” are widespread within the Union. However, without
a clear consensus of the time frame of enlargement they lack a crucial ingredient.
On agricultural policy, the EU (DGV1) has undertaken an evaluation of the situation in the
associated countries and on the possible implications of accession on the CAP, as well as an
assessment of the efforts undertaken by he EU to fulfill its GATT obligations. It appears the
EU recognizes that the accession of Central European countries will reinforce the existing
internal trend to move away from production-related support to direct financial support for
farmers themselves; there is a conviction that the CAP’s share of the EU budget (around 35
billion ECU or 50% in 1993) should remain capped; and that a long transition period for
agriculture will be required. But, crucially, no clear signals have been sent to the associated
countries. They may well face the wrong short-term incentives (for instance, to increase
agricultural trade protection or to set up support mechanisms that will eventually need to be
reversed).
The structural funds (worth around 20 billion ECU in 1993) are up for review in 1999. Their
purpose is to promote European integration through a redistributive process; their level was
raised in 1992 at the request of the EU’s poorest members in compensation for th
implementation of the Single Market. Eligibility for most of the structural funds is currently
based on per capita income: any region of the EU with an income per head below 75% of the
Union’s average is eligible for such support. On this basis all the new Central European
members would be eligible. If support were extended in the same way that it is now, this
would enormously increase the burden structural fund payments placed on the EU’s budget;
if would also result in a level of financial transfer that Central European countries would have
difficulty in absorbing. For both reasons a new approach is required. The EU, as yet, has
made little progress in defining it. 
7Other, complex issues remain less studied. The suitability of much of the EU’s organization
of a social market economy to the poorer countries of Central Europe is unresolved. Does
it make sense, for instance, for Central European countries to adop  the Social Chapter? Even
in the richest countries of Western Europe the purpose and sustainability of some regulations,
social provisions and sectoral subsidies is debated. It would be unfortunate if Central
European countries adapted regulations of the EU that were either to change soon, or were
unsuited to their situation.  Of course, Central European countries have already inherited
many unsustainable social provisions of their own (unbearable pensions burdens, for instance).
These would not disappear with entry to the Union. But a major gain of rapid, and
conditional, accession, would be that the current policies would have a clear goal to aim for,
and that upon accession, common solutions could be sought that will maximize fuller
integration and faster growth for the wider Europe.  
 
The conditionality and modalities that we discuss below are a step in this direction. Our
proposal differs from the EU’s approach so far as discussed above in that we explicitly
address the issue of conditionality. Conditionality on the Central Europeans (in terms of
broad, defined criteria that must be fulfilled) and conditionality on the Union (in the form of
an explicit ex ante commitment to admit countries that fulfill these criter a after a specified
target date). Our proposals also differs from other accession proposals, of which the most
explicit is for a near-permanent “pre-accession structure” (Baldwin 1994). He suggests an
association of the association agreements (AAA) followed by an Organization of European
Integration (OEI). The main benefits would be to get out of the “hub and spoke” mentality
of the current association agreements, where each associated country has a legal relationship
with the European Union, but there is no cumulative benefit amongst associated members.
The goal of an OEI would be to drop contingent protection rules amongst its members and
exploit the possibility of increased integration wherever it is “uns nsitive” and budget-neutral.
It would, in effect, be like an improved European Economic Area. While we subscribe to
much of Baldwin’s analysis, his propoals fails to avoid the trap of self-fulfilling expectations
of constant postponement of actual integration.
3. An improved accession strategy
Addressing the weaknesses of the current “pre-accession” strategy means progress in three
areas. We argue that there needs to be a commitment to a target date for entry; that there
must be transparent and verifiable conditions for entry, and that the modalities for entry need
to be clearly spelt out now.
3.a. Commitment to a target date
The previous sections have emphasized the importance of a stronger commitment to
enlargement than has been the case so far. A specific target date appears as one of the clearest
ways to signal this stronger commitment, and so play an important incentive role. It sets clear
responsibilities upon incumbents and applicants, and it creates a window of opportunity for
a group of potential applicants at a given point in the EU’s process of deepening and
widening.
8(I) Commitments of the incumbents:
By setting  a target date, the EU recognizes that it has no reasons to keep out countries that
satisfy pre-set conditions for membership. This means that if the EU has to reform itself to
make enlarged membership workable, it commits itself to doing so by a given date, or to
accept the consequences of working with new members under old rules. As discussed in
section 2, the EU has already r cognized that internal reform is necessary. A commitment to
a target date would place much needed credibility on this realization. Strictly speaking,
maximum credibility requires two target dates: a target date for the commencement of
negotiations  and a maximum period for negotiations, provided, of course, that the applicant
countries fulfill the relevant conditions. 
(ii) Responsibilities of the applicant
The target date for accession should indicate that , in the view of the current EU members,
the applicant could effectively be able to enter if all conditional reforms are made. A failure
to fulfill the conditions by the target date would be the clear responsibility of the applicant.
It is thus important to frame the conditions realistically, so that they can indeed be met
assuming that reforms remain on course. The conditions must not be perceived as simply a
more formalized “barrier to entry” by being set impossibly high. The time-lag between th
target date for the commencement of negotiations and that of accession will be largely the
responsibility of the applicant.
(iii) If the target date for accession is perceived by applicants as a window of opportunity,
during which present members commit themselves not to undertake any further “deepening”
projects other than those currently existing, it will have an added incentive effect. Applicants
that are able to enter during this period will have a guarantee that they do not face a moving
target and will be able to participate in all further legislative work of the EU. The ability to
participate in law-making is on of the strongest differences between any form of association
and full membership, and is therefore an important benefit of entry. Applicants who are not
ready for entry by the target date face the risk that the EU will launch ne  projects for further
integration, that could make entry harder at a later date.
3.b. Motivation for membership criteria.
The conditionality of admission should be in the spirit of the Copenhagen Declaration which
implied that EU membership would be conditional on economic and political progress, albeit
ill-defined. In addition, explicit and verifiable conditionality, linked with a target date for
entry, holds clear benefits for both parties. 
There are several reasons why clear conditionality is in the interests of the EU. It should
ensure that the candidates share the same objective as the EU, that they have similar
democratic and market-oriented institutions that make co-operation within the EU possible.
It should ensure that the principle of market unity is not threatened by perceptions of “free-
riding” or complicated by the need for n w attempts at harmonization. Explicit and verifiable
conditions help the EU solve the “who gets in” problem in a way that is not perceived as
9arbitrary. The applicant countries will be forced to take a greater share of responsibility for
ensuring their entry upon themselves.
Conditionality is also in the best interests of the candidate countries. It gives guidelines for
reform to governments. It can help the electorate - which is presently quite confused about
what is and what is not market-oriented reform - to evaluate the programmes of different
parties. Supposing that EU membership is a widely shared objective, it can introduce some
healthy competition between parties on how best to satisfy the conditions. This powerful
incentive to reform can only work with a clear commitment on the part of the EU to reward
reforms with membership. Hence the need for a target date to work in conjunction with
explicit conditionality. 
An objection often raised against a more precise definition of the conditions suggested in the
Copenhagen declaration is that a functioning market economy cannot be defined in a set of
legal rules and quantitative achievements. Such conditions, it is argued, would even resemble
central planning. Former socialist countries would be expert at meeting the letter of the
conditions without reaching the broader economic objectives behind them; there would be an
incentive to obfuscate and cheat. Real as this risk is, it does not take away from the usefulness
of guidelines. There are many understandable complaints about the Maastricht criteria, but
there is little doubt that the programme of monetary union could not go forwards without
some clear criteria, however imperfect. Moreover, a country takes the sovereign decision to
join the EU knowing that it has to adjust to the Union more than the Union will adjust to any
new member. When the modalities of entry are well-defined (see below), the sovereign
decision to join makes possible a political cost-benefit analysis by the applicant country;
indirectly in the course of national elections and, perhaps, finally in the form of a national
referendum. 
3.c. Structure and design of the conditions
The design of such accession conditions should ensure that they have four characteristics: that
they are within the control of the applicants, that they are relevant for integration, that they
are verifiable and that they are broad enough to be good indicators of the development of a
market economy, not merely subject to political or statistical manipulations. Broadly, they can
be divided into three types. The list that follows is illustrative and designed to introduce the
subsequent discussion.
1. Institutional or legal conditions:
* Adoption of the “acquis communautaire” except in specific opt-out areas (e.g.
   Social Charter, labor mobility). 
          * Commitment to no other regional integration mechanisms other than those
   that are compatible with the EU.
2. Microeconomic management conditions:
    * Subsidy levels that are close to the EU average
    * Share of private sector in value added that is close to the EU average
10
            * Effective protection and trade of property rights; effective competition  
    policy; functioning financial sector
3. Macroeconomic management conditions:
    * A softer form of the Maastricht convergence criteria (on budget deficits;
inflation rates, etc.)
The first type of conditions - institutional and legal - are n cess ry but not sufficient. They are
most clearly within the control of applicant countries, relatively easy for the EU to stipulate,
are clearly relevant for integration. The White Paper (COM (95) 163) is a good example of
this type of legal and institutional conditionality. The question of verifiability, however, is
more difficult. Adopting a legal framework without the support of effectively functioning
institutions could result in an empty shell. For this reason, these conditions need to be
supplemented with further types of conditions, that provide evidence of an applicant country’s
commitment to reform and ability to adhere to newly established laws and guidelines. 
The management conditions (microeconomic and macroeconomic) are not sufficient alone
either. Some countries could reach them without adopting EU-compatible institutions.
However, they are necessary to facilitate the working of the single market and they provide
direct evidence on the progress of economic reforms. In both cases, macroeconomic and
microeconomic, management conditions are largely within the control of national authorities,
despite claims to the contrary.  In neither case should n excessively high standard be set. For
instance, it makes little sense to expect Central European countries to fulfill criteria for
monetary union before they become members of the EU.
A fourth type of conditionality could include explicitly measurable performance conditions
like per capita GDP, export growth or employment creation. In some instances, such
performance-based criteria could play a useful role in supplementing the other, mor
immediate policy conditions. A country that felt its microeconomic achievements were being
unfairly judged, would, for instance, have more of a case if its growth performance and net
employment creation were booming.  But the fact that such conditions would be partly
beyond the control of policy makers in an applicant country, makes them dangerous and
subject o the kind of self-fulfilling failures that we discussed earlier. For this reason, we do
not advocate explicit “economic performance criteria” but would add a more general
stipulation that the Commission would need to b  convinced that an applicant country would
be able to sustain economic growth under the conditions of membership. Preceding high rates
of economic growth, export growth etc could be useful as supporting evidence, but would
not be dispositive.
3.d. Modalities of accession
The modalities of entry need to be agreed before accession. Thes  should cover, in particular,
the adjustments that are required in sensitive areas. In agriculture, for instance, a long
transition period will clearly be required. Its length and the necessary adjustments required
by both sides in the interim need to be made clear. Regarding structural funds, it is clear that
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it is in the interest of he EU budget to limit them. Moreover, we suggest that it is not in the
long-term interest of applicant countries to regard financial assistance levels as a key benefit
of accession. Such transfers will promote rent seeking behavior, and the magnitudes of
assistance are likely to be too small to influence long-term economic growth markedly. We
would therefore suggest a more radical proposal: that applicant countries should
renounce their eligibility for structural funds in return for a commitment to rapid
accession. In return the EU should accept a near-term date for accession of the leading
reform economies.
One of the key modalities of accession will be the renunciation by EU members of the resort
to “safeguard measures” from the moment of accession onwards. This is crucial for trade
integration and for augmenting the confidence of Western enterprises that an investment in
Central Europe is indeed an investment in production within the single European Union
market.  Similarly, the applicant cou ries should be allowed an opt-out on the social charter
(a luxury their low productivity and income levels do not afford). In return they should
renounce the immediate freedom of labor flows, to allay West European fears of mass
migration.  Finally, while full voting rights should come immediately upon membership, new
members should not be allowed to use their voting rights to change the modalities of their
transition phase. These modalities should be “grandfathered” before entry. In essence, these
modalities will ensure that while there is a long transition phase in certain sectors and policies,
while there is in some sense a lengthy transitional phase of a two-class EU membership, the
long-term is locked in place ex ante. It is this certainty that will prove essential for stabilizing
positive expectations and promoting growth. 
4.   A modest proposal
We outline here a modest proposal for discussion. It shows how our analysis can be the basis
of a concrete proposal. The specific contents of conditions and modalities should, of course,
be discussed by the applicants and the EU Commission and members. We distinguish 7
conditions and 10 modalities.
4.a. Milestones before accession.
1. The EU will commit itself to start negotiating accession in 1998 and will indicate that it
sees the year 2000 as the year of enlargement for the countries that meet the criteria.
2. The EU will review the fulfillment of the criteria before the accession of a first group of
countries and will indicate a new target date for meeting the criteria to the remaining
countries.
3. The applicants will refrain from entering into commercial, military or political alliances 
with non-members of the EU, and will agree with the EU on the contents of all such existing
or intended international agreements.
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4. The applicants will adopt the “acquis communautaire” except in the areas of the opt-out
of the transition period (agriculture, social charter, structural funds - see modalities below).
They will also ensure the proper functioning of commercial and civil law, including the
protection of proerty rights, the enforcement of contracts, competition policy, bankruptcy,
freedom of enterprise creation and development...These institutional developments will be
reviewed annually with the Commission and all applicants.
5. Microeconomic management: not more than the highest of 20 percent or one standard
deviation above EU average on subsidies as a percent of GDP (so if average subsidies in the
EU are 3 percent of GDP and the standard deviation is 1 percent, the maximum would be 4
percent). The private sector share in employment should not be less than 60 percent. These
milestones should also be reviewed annually, and a qualitative review of gross private
enterprise creation and net employment creation in the private sector should complement
them. Given the low starting point of the applicants, these indicators should in no case be
below the EU average.
6. Macroeconomic management: Inflation below 15% per year or below the average of the
non-ERM members provided there are no less than three (currently these are Britain, Finland,
Greece, Italy and Sweden), whichever is highest. Budget deficit under 5 percent of GDP.
Public debt as a percent of GDP stabilized or declining. These performances should be
maintained over a period of 3 years or steadily converging to the target over a period of 3
years, and they should be monitored annually by the Commission and the applicants. The
inflation target could be limited to tradable goods inflation (and then made more stringent)
if it is demonstrated that faster productivity growth in tradable than non tradables is a key
factor in the overall inflation rate.
7. The criteria for monetary union need not be met for membership, but are part of the
modalities applicable after accession. A commitment to the modalities of monetary union
(modality 9, below) in the accession treaty is nevertheless a condition for membership.
4.b. Modalities after accession
1. Ten year transition period commencing upon membership.
2. The new members will participate in voting within the Council and the Parliament and be
represented or eligible as all other members in all common institutions. The new members will
have no right to alter the modalities of their transition period (financial and others), without
a special majority vote (as determined by the IGC for the modification of the treaties) of the
pre-existing members of the European Union.
3. Both the EU and the new members will r nounce immediately the right to apply safeguard
measures (anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, contingent protection). Trade, except
in agriculture, will be governed by the adoption of EU competition policy upon the start of
membership, including Commission review of subsidy policies.
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4. Agriculture will remain protected, with border controls, and a gradual and preferential
reduction of the existing quotas and tariffs scheduled to reach full integration of agricultural
policies and free trade in agricultural goods within the 10 year transition period. The new
members will not join the Common Agricultural Policy during the first five years.
5. The new members will renounce unilaterally the claims to all structural funds during the
transition period.
6. The new members will participate fully in Community-wide infrastructure projects, and all
initiatives with a Community-wide character (including the energy grid, transport systems,
communication systems, community-based science initiatives, community-based education
initiatives, assistance to foreign or developing countries)
7. The new members contribution to the EU budget will be scaled downward in proportion
to their non-participation in the structural funds programmes, and in the CAP.
8. During the ten-year transition, the new members will waive the freedom of movement of
labor (into Western Europe), and will also opt out of the Social Charter. The ultimat
disposition of the Social Charter will be determined jointly in the course of the ten year
period.
9. The new members will meet the criteria for monetary union within 5 years of membership,
or within 3 years of the introducti n of the common currency, whichever comes latest. After
two years of “grace period”, they will be subject to macroeconomic management by the
Commission in order to enabl  them to enter the monetary union by the end of the transition
period.
10. The new members will part ci te in all discussions of issues of current or future interest
to the Union, and in the drafting and signing of all new treaties and constitutional articles.
They will participate in the reform of all policies, but their votes will not be counted in the
areas to which they do not participate fully until the end of the 10-year transition period
(agriculture, structural funds, social charter).
    
5. Conclusions
Neither the European Commission nor member govrnments in the European Union have yet
put forwards practical suggestions for speeding the accession of reforming countries in
Central Europe. To many participants in European politics, there is a hope that controversial
issues linked to enlargement - such as the CAP, voting rights and structural funds - can simply
be avoided if the subject of enlargement is pushed under the rug for a few years. This would
be fine, perhaps, if the costs of uncertainty about enlargement were not so high. In fact, the
current ambiguities over EU enlargement court disaster in Europe, by upsetting the process
of economic and political reforms in the post communist economies, and by undermining the
crucial confidence of investors in the region.
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The obstacles to enlargement are far from insurmountable, and could be addressed through
a range of clear and practical compromises. The Central European applicants need the
economic and geopolitical security of membership; they do not n ed huge budgetary transfers
nor immediate membership of the CAP. Nor does the EU have to guarantee immediate rights
to labor mobility at the time of accession. Even with rapid accession, it will be necessary to
stipulate an extended adjustment period for both sides, as has been done in earli r cases of
enlargement.
We offer a set of practical guidelines for quick accession.  In our view, the EU should commit
to open negotiations with the applicant countries in 1998. Accession should be possible by
2000, assuming that the applicant meets various conditionalities for membership.  Thes
conditionalities should guarantee an accelerated pace for legal and economic reforms, both
on the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels.  
The modalit es of accession should include a 10-year transition period, during which
agricultural trade and mobility of labor will be gradually liberalized. The applicant countries
should renounce their claims on EU structural funds, both because they do not n ed them, and
because the fears amongst some EU countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland) about the
diversion of structural funds, now represent a large hurdle to quick accession.  In fact,
reliance on structural funds would probably worsen the political culture in the new members,
by encouraging rent-seeking and an overly large role of government in investment spending.
However, accession should lead to an immediate cessation of resort to safeguard measures
in trade; to the full adoption of the acquis communautaire, with a few stipulated exceptions;
and to the full involvement of the new members in regional infrastructure projects and in the
governance of the EU itself. In this way, both existing EU members and applicant countries
can maximize the benefits of EU enlargement, while minimizing the costs. 
15
                                                               APPENDIX A
To show the importance of a commitment to a rapid enlargement of the EU, w  use a small model of self-
fulfilling rational expectations in the spirit of Krugman (1991).  The model is characterized by three
equilibria.  There are two stable equilibria: full development (catch-up) and complete stagnation. There
is an unstable equilibrium in-between, where firms are indifferent between modernization and their
traditional activities.  
We assume that the returns to a diversification or modernization investment in a given period t are a
function of the number of enterprises already diversifying.  This captures the idea of increasing returns
at the country level, which can be due to the diffusion of knowledge (Grossman & Helpman 1991),
trading externalities, or the concentration of demand in a region (Krugman 1991).  In the present context
we prefer the first two interpretations.  The net present value of such an investment is written q:
q = I  [A(n)-n ] e  ds. (1)t  t 4  A  -r(s-t)
where A(n) is the value of the investment and n is the value of the status quo.  We have kept theA
notation of Krugman (1991) wherever possible to show that our model is not conceptually different from
his, but simply adapted to a different situation.  
Integrating q to infinity, or simply requiring equal returns in the alternative investment at the world
interest rate, gives an equality between the world interest rate and the sum of the instantaneous profit
(A(n)-n) and of the expected capital gain (dq/dt which stems from the expected future profits) A
r = (dq/dt + [A(n)-n]) / q. (2)A
which can then be solved for dq/dt to give the law of motion of q.
Investors create new firms responding to a positive expected profit q>0 at a rate (, which can be
interpreted as derived from a quadratic cost function.  The continuous rate of firm creation, which is also
the law of motion of n, is thus 
dn/dt = (q. (3)
To explain the dynamics of the model, we have to be more explicit about the profit function.  The
relevant range of n is between n (the status quo or autarky number of firms) and N (the EU integrationA
number of firms).  The diversifcation is thus a "catch-up" growth, i.e. the convergence process referred
to in the text, which comes on top of any underlying trend.  The economy is sure to get the profits from
n , but this fall-back opti n corresponds to an underdevelopment trap.  For a given number of firms n,A                  *
firms are indifferent between investing in diversification and st y ng i  a status quo: below n, the profits*
are lower than n (An<n)<n); above n, we have A(n>n)>n.  The profit function can be writtenA * A   *    * A
A(n) = n + $ [(n/N) - (n/N)] .                           (4)t      tA     *
There is thus an externality from each firm's diversification investment: it improves the returns from
other firms' diversification investments.  Diversification, in turn, improves the chances of entry into the
EU, if only because a country wi h less agriculture, less backward regions or less declining industries is
less of a burden for the EU budget, and less of a competitor for the declining sectors of the EU.  Entry
into the EU improves the expected return from investment. 
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Putting the specification (4) of A(n) into equation (2) and solving for dq/dt gives, together with (3), the
full dynamics of the model.  The roots D of the dynamic system are:
D = [r±(r- 4$(/N) ]/2. (5)2  ½
Real positive roots occur when $(/N is small, the intermediate equilibrium n is then unstable, and the*
stable endpoint that will be reached (n or N) is fully determined by the historical position of n relativeA
to n.  The dynamics are presented in figure 1.  Complex roots occur when r is small and $(/N is big;*
then, for a range of values of n ar und n, the system can spiral towards one of the two stable equilibria*
at N or n, as in figure 2.  The expectations of the agents about the equilibrium that will be reachedA
determine the path that is chosen: expectations are self-fulfilling. 
A policy of boosting the expectations of entry into the EU can coordinate the expectations of the agents
and put the economy on a virtuous growth path.  This is the most important policy message from this
model, it applies if the system has complex roots, thus when flexibility is high. 
The reference to the flexibility of the economy in the text corresponds to high values of the parameters
of adjustment, $ and (.  They make past history less relevant and make adjustment according to
optimistic (or pessimistic) expectations faster and more likely.  A low value of N has the same effect as
a high  value of $.  Such a low value of N could be interpreted as a short distance between the level of
development of the applicant country and the EU.  A low opportunity cost of capital r  helps to catch up
too.  Entry into the EU could contribute to this too by raising the time horizon and lowering the risk
premium. 
The initial conditions referred to in the text are represented by the exogenous value n at which the*
instantaneous profits from diversifying or not are equal.   Improvements in infrastructure or education
could lower the cost of diversifying and so lower n. Indeed, the externality coming from the number of*
diversifying firms is equivalent to a public good.  A boom in foreign direct investment could lower the
domestic value of n, showing the importance of foreign direct investment in a model of diversification*
externalities. 
Once the economy reaches the level of diversification of the EU, further growth is still possible, but
governed by the dynamics of a different model than the catch-up model presented here.  
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